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Recent corporate scandals have led to p ublic pressure to
reform business practices and increase regulation. Of course,
dishonesty, greed, and cover-ups are not new societal con
cerns. Indeed, much of the existing system of corporate regu
lation in the United States emerged in response to vagaries of
the late 1920s and the subsequent stock market crash. What
has changed in recent years, though, is the frequency and pub
lic salience of corporate scandals. As a measure of p ublic at
tention, media coverage of corporate governance issues has in
creased sharply since the fall of 2001, when Enron declared
dramatic third quarter losses. Over the past three years, sto
ries on corporate governance increased by more than five
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times in the Wall Street journal and more than ten times in USA
Today, relative to the previous three years. 1
The public outcry over the recent scandals has made it
clear that the status quo is no longer acceptable: the public is
demanding accountability and responsibility in corporate be
havior. It is widely believed that it wiil take more than just
leadership by the corporate sector to restore public confi
dence in our capital markets and ensure their ongoing vitality.
It will also take effective government action, in the form of
reformed regulatory systems, improved auditing, and stepped
up law enforcement.
Already policymakers have adopted numerous reforms.
In 2002, Congress speedily passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,'2 im
posing (among other things) new financial control and report
ing requirements on publicly traded companies. The Securi
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the self-regula
tory organizations it oversees-both the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD")-have adopted new standards for public
companies and securities dealers." The newly created Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") is working
to revamp oversight of auditors.4 Finally, state and federal enl . We compared the results of Westlaw searches for the three years
p rior to Enron 's loss disclosure on October 16, 200 1 , with results for the
three subsequen t years. In the Wall Street Journal database, coverage in
creased from 3 1 4 stories containing the words "corporate governance" in the
1998-2001 period to 1,852 stories in the 2001-2004 period. In USA Today,
hardly a newspaper noted for its financial coverage, the n u mber of stories
mentioning "corporate governance" increased from 22 to 256. Not surpris
ingly, the number of stories with the terms "cot·porate fraud" also in
creased-from 7 to 1 51 stories in the Wall Street journal, and zero to 71 sto
ries in USA Today.
2. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 ( codi
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S. C.) [hereinafter Sarban es-Oxley Act].
3. See NASD Manual Rule 4350 (2003) , available at h ttp:/ / cchwallstreet.
com/ nasd/ nasdviewe r.asp;SelectedNode=4&Fi leName=/ n asd/ nascl_rules/
RulesoftheA<>sociation_mg.xml#chp_1_4; NYSE Listed Company Manual
§ 303A ( 2003), available at http:/ / www .nyse .com/listecl/pl0 20656067970.
h tm l?displayPage=%2Fabout%2F l 0455 1 6490394. hun)
4. See William J M c Donough, Chairman Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, Speech at the Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on
Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, 9 FoRDK'\l'vi J. CoRP. & FIN. L., 583,
595-97 ( 2004); see also P CAOB, BRIEFING PAPER: PROPOSED AuDITING STAN
DARD oN CoNFORMING 1\o'V!ENDMENTS TO PCAOB INTERIM STANDARDS REsuLT-

forcement officials have responded by aggressively pursuing a
number of highly publicized prosecutions against corporate
leaders and others accused of violatin g financial rules.''
These responses make clear that the governance of corpo
rations has become a central item on the public policy agenda.
The recent scandals themselves demonstrate that lax regula
tory institutions, standards, and enforcement can have huge
implications for t he economy and for the public.h Of course,
go';ernrnent responses to scandals should be well considered
and etTective. Regulatory reforms that over-react or that ad
dress symptoms while ignoring underlying causes can be costly
and counterproductive. The task of government is to restore
corporate i ntegrity and market confidence without stifling the
dynamism that underlies a strong economy.
To address this challenge, the Center for Business and
Government and its Regulatory Policy Program organized a
conference in May 2004 to explore the role of government in
corporate governance. The conference brought together gov
ernment officials, business leaders, and academ ic researchers
INC FRO:VI THE ADOPTION OF PCAOB AuDITING ST\l"D.-\RD No. 2, (2004), avail
able
at
h ttp://ww\v. pcaobus.org/Rules_of_the_Board/Documents/B rief
ingPaper-0040308-2.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General
Elliot Spitzer, Spitzer Announces Market-Timing Settlement with Bane One
Advisors Corporation Quly 29, 2004) , available at http://www .
oag.state . ny.us/press/2004/jun/jun29d_04. html; Press Release, Office of
New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, Spitzer, S.E.C. Reach Largest
M utual Fund Settlement Ever ( Mar. 1 5, 2004) , available at http://www. oag.
state.ny.us/p ress/2004/mar/marl5c_04. html ; see also SECURITIES & Ex
CIHNGE CoMMISSION, SEC 2003 ANNU.-\L REPORT, ENFORCEMENT ( 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/an n rep03/ar03enforce.pdf; Press Release, Office
of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Secre tary Galvin Charges Managers
of Three H edge Funds for Targe ting U nsoph isticated Investors (Aug. 1 3 ,
2003) , available at http://www. sec.state .ma.us/set/ sctpdf/hedgefundpress
rei. pdf
6. SPe Lynne L. Dallas, A Prdim in ruy Inquily into iltf Responsibility of CmjJo
rations and their Officers and Direr/on for CmjJomte Climate: the Psychology of En
ron's De·mise, 35 RUTGERS LJ. 1 , 1 ( 2003) (" [T] he reverberating effects of
En ron's demise undermined confidence in U . S . stock markets."); see also
Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Han drich, The Enron Efj"ect: Uncertainty, i'vlistrust,
and Cynicism, ATLA Win ter 2003 Conven tion Reference Materials, Advocacy
Track: Com municating with the Jury-Repackaging Your Message ( Feb.
2003) ( "The wave of corporate meltdowns epitomized by the En ron scandal
has had the effect of erodi ng the fai th workers p lace in our cou n try's busi
ness i nstitutions .").
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to discuss three fundamental public policy challenges raised by
recent corporate abuses.
First, the recent corporate crisis has brought into relief
the challenge of who should regulate. Currently, the govern
ment shares regulatory authority and oversight with various
nongovernmental, self-regulatory institutions. Self-regulation
has been prominent in the operation of securities markets as
well as in the oversight of the accounting and legal profes
sions. Are these existing self-regulatory arrangements suffi
cient? Should government change its oversight of self-regula
tory institutions? Or should government assume a greater and
more direct role in regulating?
In addition to choosing who will regulate, recent scandals
have h ighlighted the challenge of deciding how to regulate.
Most broadly, regulators face a choice between principles and
rules. Should regulatory standards articulate broad goals and
purposes; guiding behavior through the adherence to general
principles? Or should regulations take the form of specific
rules that tell companies and their lawyers and auditors exactly
what is acceptable and unacceptable? Rules have their virtues,
and they have been widely used, but they also may allow corpo
rate actors to find ways to comply with the letter of the law
while circumventing its spirit.
Finally, regulators face the challenges of deciding how to
enforce the rules or principles they have adopted. Is more ag
gressive enforcement needed? Should enforcement officials
target just individual perpetrators, or should they also go after
the corporations in which they work? When should regulators
pursue criminal (as opposed to civil) sanctions? Furthermore,
since both the state and federal governments have jurisdiction
over publicly traded corporations, enforcement officials m ust
constructively deal with jurisdictional competition.
These three major policy challenges framed the delibera
tions at the conference held at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government. This article summarizes that discussion and is
organized in three parts: (l) government regulation versus
self-regulation, (2) the design of regulatory standards, and (3)
regulatory enforcement.
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I.
SELF-REGUI.AT!ON

For the past century, self-regulatory institutions have
played a central role in policing both corporate behavior and
the behavior of the professionals involved in corporate trans
actions. Since the 1930s, the nation's securities laws have ex
pressly authorized self-regulatory organizations, such as the
NYSE or the NASD, to assume primary responsibility for
rulemaking and enforcement of securities violations.' In addi
tion, the actions of corporate accountants, corporate lawyers,
and financial advisors have been subject to oversight by self
regulatory bodies."
In light of the recent series of corporate scandals, it is rea
sonable to ask whether the current structure of self-regulation
is adequate. However, deciding who should regulate corpo
rate behavior and securities transactions is not merely a choice
between either government or self-regulationY Rather, it is a
question of when and how self-regulation should be used.
What are the conditions under which self-regulation is appro7. Po l ly Nyquist, Failure to Engage: The Regulation of Proj:rrieta1y Trading
Systnns, l?> Y-\LE L. & PoL'v REv. 281, 290-292 (1995); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 6(b)(l), 15 U .S.C.A. § 78f (noting that for national securities
exchanges, "the rules of the exchange [must be] designed to prevent fraudu
lent and manipulative acts and practices."); Securities Exchange Act of 1 934
§ 1 5A(b)( 1 ), 1 5 U.S. C.A. § 78o-3 (addressing registration and self-regulation
of national securities associations).
8. Some financial advisors have been subject to oversight by NASD or
the exchanges. See, e.g., Press Release, NASD Regulation, Inc . , NASD
Charges H&R Block Financial Advisors With Fraud in Sale of Enron Bonds
to Hundreds of Customers ( Nov. 8, 2004), available at h ttp:/ / www . nasd.
com/ stellent/iclcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ss DocName=NASDW_012
056&ssSourceNodeid=553; Richard Spinale, Exchange Hearing Panel Deci
sion 04-160 (New York Stock Exchange Oct. 5, 2004), available at h ttp:/ I
www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-160.pdf; In the Matter of Lawrence Berman, Ameri
can Stock Exchange (Nov. 2004), available at h ttp:/ /www.amex.com/at
amex/ regulation/ discipline/ 2004/ Berman_Decision_ll0204.pdf. Lawyers
an d accountants have their own self-regulatory overseers.
9. For a discussion of different allocations of regulatory authority, see
Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in F'inancial
Regulation, 2 THEOR. INQUIRIES IN LAw 4 (200 1), available at http:/ / www . law.
h arvard .edu/ facult:y/ h jackson/ pdfs/200 1 Jackson. Cen tralization .Theoretic
al .lnquiries.pclf; Securities & Exchange Com m ission, Concept Release Con
cerning SelfRegulation, Release No. 34-50700 (Nov. 18, 2004), available al
http:/ I sec .govI rules/ concept/34-50700.htm.
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priate? And when it is appropriate, how should self-regulation
be structured to maximize its advantages and minimize its dis
advantages?
The

"-idvantages and Disadvantages of Self-Regulation

To some, the term self-regulation is an oxymoron, or some
thing akin to the fox guarding the chicken. But self-regulation
offers a number of potential advantages in the realm of corpo
rate regulation. Conference participants highlighted at least
five potential advantages of self-regulation:
1. Proximity. Self-regulatory organizations are, by defini
tion, closer to the industry being regulated. This close prox
imity means that self-regulatory organizations will generally
have more detailed and current information about the indus
try, something that is especially helpful in rapidly changing
sectors. By comparison, government regulators are often play
ing "catch up." Being closer to the action, self-regulators are
better situated to identify potential problems more quickly.
2. Flexibility. Self-regulatory organizations can act with
greater flexibility than government regulators. They are not
subject to the same kinds of procedural and due process hur
dles that government is, nor do they face the same political
constraints. Governmental regulators do not relish dealing
with politically unpopular or extremely complex issues, so
these issues can be delegated to self-regulatory bodies.
3.

ComjJliance. Self-regulation may generate a higher level

of compliance. The greater the involvement of industry in set
ting the rules, the more those rules may appear reasonable to
individual firms. Self-regulation may also generate rules that
solve the regulatory problem in ways more sensitive to industry
practices and constraints, and hence it may be easier for firms
to comply with them.
4. Collective Interests of Industry. Self-regulation can harness
the collective interests of the industry. This may be another
\Nay that self-regulation promotes compliance, as competitors
can effectively "police" each other.
5. Resources. Self-regulatory bodies may have a better abil
ity to secure needed resources. In addition, when regulatory
funding is self-directed, the legislature cannot cut it off or use
it as a leverage point over the self-regulatory body.
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Although self-regulation has these important advantages,
it also has some noteworthy drawbacks. Self-regulation pos
sesses at least five potential disadvantages:
1 Conflicts of Interest. The very proximity that can help the
self-regulator acquire useful information can be a disadvan
tage because of conflicts of interest. Knowing an industry bet
ter does not mean that a regulator will have the proper incen
tives to regulate it more effectively. There is also the possibility
that self-regulation will be used by older, more established en
tities simply to keep out newer market entrants.
_

2. Inadequate Sanctions. The greater flexibility afforded
self�regulatory organizations also means they may have the dis
cretion to mete out only modest sanctions against even serious
violators. Conference participants noted several instances of
self�regulatory organizations imposing small sanctions for
egregious malfeasance.
3. Underenforcement. Self-regulators' conflicts of interest
and flexibility may also make it more likely that compliance
with rules will be insufficiently monitored. If industry's inter
ests are at variance with society's interests, then enforcement
with self-regulation might be less than optimal for the overall
good of society.
4. Global Competition. In a global marketplace, an indus
try's collective interest can be defined by competition with for
eign markets. If foreign markets are not equally burdened
with regulation, then aggressive self-regulation could put do
mestic firms at a serious disadvantage, providing yet another
reason to question whether self-regulators will make socially
optimal decisions.
5.

Insuf
f icient Resources. Although the funding of self-regu

latory bodies may not be susceptible to the whims of legisla
tures, underlying conflicts of interest could leave self-regula
tory bodies with less than sufficient funding.
Clearly, self-regulation has both advantages and disadvan
tages. It is neither an inherently good nor inherently bad way
to regulate corporate conduct. The challenge, then, is to find
the situations in which self-regulation is the most appropriate
model. After that, the challenge becomes finding optimal
\Nays of designing self-regulatory institutions.
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Designing SelfRegulatory Institutions
Even if existing self-regulatory institutions receive some of
the blame for recent scandals, it does not follow that self-regu
lation should be abandoned entirely. Instead, the solution
may be to change the internal governance structures of self
regulatory institutions, grant them new powers or increase
their resources, or modify the degree and type of government
oversight they receive.
Self-regulatory organizations can be designed in different
ways.10 Some self-regulatory bodies are stronger and more ef
fective than others. At the weakest end of the spectrum lies a
voluntary industry code of conduct for which compliance is
voluntary and the industry has little or no enforcement capa
bility. For example, the Association of Investment Manage
ment and Research (now known as the CFA Institute) simply
has the power to revoke the ability of its members to refer to
themselves as "chartered financial analysts."11 At the other
end of the spectrum lie self-regulatory bodies with greater
powers both to make and to enforce binding rules. The tradi
tional securities self-regulatory organizations, such as NYSE
and NASD, develop extensive sets of rules and can bar those
who violate these rules altogether from participating in the se
curities markets.12 In between these poles lie organizations
such as state bar associations that possess little regulatory au
thority but have the power to disbar or exclude, as well as self
regulatory bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards
Board ("FASB") that have the power to adopt rules but rela
tively little ability to enforce them. '"'
In addition, some self-regulatory bodies are more closely
connected with the industry's self-interest than others. Institu
tions that share responsibilities for both creating markets and
regulating them will face an inherent conflict-whether real
l 0 . Margo Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Fivl' ModeL� of Seif-Regula
Orr.·\WA L. R£\". 233 (1997) .
11. See Bylaws of the CFA Institute § 3.10 (a) (1) (2004) , available at
h ttp://www.cfainstitute .org/memservices/ pdf/cfainsti tutearticlesandbylaws
2004finalve rsion2. pdf.
12. NASD Manual Rule 8310, available at http://cchwallstreet.com/
nasd/nasdviewer.asp?SelectedNode=2&FileName=/nascl/ n asd_rules/Rules
oftheAssociation_mg.xm l#chp_1_2; NYSE Rule 476.
13. See generally Fi nancial Accounting Standards Board I n formati o n , at
http://www.fasb. org.
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or perceived-that is absent from institutions that keep regula
tory functions separate from market operations. The NASD
and, more recently, the NYSE have taken steps to make their
regulatory functions independent of their market operations,
precisely to keep the regulatory side of their organizations less
conflicted. 1 ·•
Finally, self-regulatory organizations can vary in terms of
the amount of government oversight they receive. Some self
regulatory institutions are entirely separate from the govern
ment, while others, such as the NYSE and NASD, are overseen
by the SEC.1''' Government oversight can help overcome some
of the limitations of self-regulation, counteracting potential
bias while still securing the advantages of self-regulation. Gov
ernment officials need not know as much as the self-regulators
do about the industry, since they are not the principal regula
tors; they simply need to be able to assess the quality and seri
ousness of a self-regulatory organization's rulemaking and en
forcement behavior. Moreover, by effectively delegating au
thority to sdf-regulatory institutions for routine regulatory
functions, government agencies can then utilize their re
sources for detecting and responding to major rule violations
and monitoring for systemic problems.

Loohing Ahead
Despite the oiticism self-regulatory institutions have re
ceived in recent years, self-regulation seems here to stay. But
self-regulation is changing. Institutions such as the NYSE are
undergoing significant structural changes, and the self-regula
tory approach to overseeing the accounting industry is being
revamped. An important task for the government in the fu
ture will be to monitor how well these changes work.
II.
RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES

Whether the regulatory body is governmental or self-regu
latory, it must decide whether to adopt principles or rules. In
14. National Association of Securities Dealers, Report of the NASD Select
Committee on Stn1clure and Governance to the NASD Board of Governors ( 1995 );
William Power, NASD Boar d Approves Restmcturing of Association and iVasdaq
Stock Market, WALL ST. J . , Nov. 20, 1995 , at B2.
15. See aLm supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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response to recent corporate scandals, many have suggested
that the current U.S. regulatory system is too focused on
rules.11' Although rules can be simple, they also can provide
an easy target for manipulation. Some observers, including the
SEC, advocate a more principles-based approach to regulation
that stresses goals and objectives rather than the particular
methods of achieving those ends. 17
Current policy responses to the recent corporate scandals
exhibit a tension between rules and principles. The most no
table legislative change has been the passage of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act, which has imposed numerous new and detailed
rules on corporations.18 At the same time, the primary ac
counting standard setter, FASB, has been criticized for relying
too much on detailed rules to determine the appropriate ac
counting treatment and, as a result, has recently explored a
more conceptual or principles-guided approach to accounting
standards.19

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Rules
In the United States, regulators and industry players often
seek refuge in rules. Indeed, industry participants often lobby
for a rules-based environment to avoid the unpredictability of
later enforcement. Rules are typically thought to be simpler
and easier to follow than principles, demarcating a clear line
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Rules also re
duce discretion on the part of individual managers or audi
tors, making it less likely that their judgments will be moti
vated by a desire to achieve personal gain at the expense of
investors or the public. The seminal work in this area is the
1 6. Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting Standards-Rules or Princi
58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 1 6 1 , 1 1 6 1 -62 (2004) ( noting that i n the wake of

ples?,

recent corporate scandals nume rous arguments have been advanced in favor
of a shift to principles-based accounting standards ) .
1 7 . Securities & Exchange Commission, Study Pursuan t to Section
1 08(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 o n the Adoption by the U n i ted
States Finan ci al Reporting System of a Principles-Based Account i n g System
(2003) , available at h ttp ://www. sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbased
stand. htm (staff report recommending a more principles-based approach to
accoun ting standards) .
18. See sujnil note 2.
1 9. FASB, Proposal: Principles-Based Approach to U . S. Standard Settin g
(Oct. 21. 2002 ), available at h ttp ://www.fasb.org/proposals/prin c i ples
based_approach. pelf.

book Pla_ving by the Rules, by Frederick Schauer of the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, which analyzes the nature of
rules-based decision making. �o
Despite the virtues of rules, in practice rules can be more
complex-and, hence, more murky-than principles. As
lawmakers try to address every conceivable eventuality, the
rulebook becomes harder to understand and harder to follow.
The tax code, for example, is heavily rules-based, and
problems often arise when corporations undertake new types
of transactions not covered by the code.�1 Determining the
appropriate tax treatment can sometimes be quite difficult,
leaving auditors with de facto discretion and creating the need
for additional rules to clarifY inconsistencies or close gaps.
Moreover, even simple and clear rules can be manipulated.
An effective planner can use the exact wording of the rule to
structure transactions in ways that comply with the letter of the
law but circumvent its underlying purpose.n

Recent Innovations in Regulatory Design
Since rules and principles each have their strengths and
weaknesses, regulators sometimes try to combine them both in
hybrid systems of regulation. Examples include recently
adopted international standards governing the computation of
risk-adjusted bank capital and the SEC's standards on calculat
ing the fair value of mutual funds.�" Both sets of regulations
rely on principles that the industry must follow in developing
and deploying complex econometric models to assess their
own compliance.
20. fREDERICK SC:Hc\UER, PLW!C.:C BY Tl IE R L Lf. S: A PI-IIl.OSOPI-IICAI. [X.'\i\11NATION oF RuLE-BAsED DECJSION-J\IL-\hJNG IN L\w ..;.No I N LIFE ( 1991).
21. See generally Noel B. Cun ningham and James R. Repetti, Texturdism
and Tax Shelters, 24 V.".. T,\X R Ev . 1 ( 20()4 ) .
2 2 . Sre, e.g., Cass R. Sunstei n, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 995
( 1995) ("Because rules have clear edges, they allow people to 'evade' them
by engaging in conduct that is techn ically exempted but that creates the
same or analogous harms.") .
23. BAsEL CoMMITTEE, BASEL II: lNTERN.·HJON.:..L CoNVERGENCE oF CAPITAL
MEASURHIENT AND C:.._PIT.-\L STAi'iD,\Ros: A RE\·IsEo FRAMEvVORK Uune 2004),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs I 07. htm [he reinafter BASEL ] ; S EC
D ivision of Investme n t Management, April 2001 Letter to the ICI Regarding
Valuation Issues, available at http://www .sec.govI divisions/investment/gui
clance/tyle043001 .htm .
I
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The international banking community is facing the imple
mentation of a new capital adequacy framework, known as Ba
sel II.24 Although the underlying document is lengthy and
complicated, the framework is based on risk-management
principles and relies heavily on the parties with access to the
best information. In this case, the regulated financial institu
tions are deemed to have the best information. Accordingly,
Basel II recognizes that banks are responsible for computing
their own bank capital and for determining the appropriate
level of bank capital (within certain specified limits) . 20 The
role of the regulator is then to supervise the private parties
after the fact. It is yet to be seen how well this innovative ap
proach will work. The success of Basel II will probably rest on
the ability of regulators to assess the sophisticated econometric
models that banks develop and, hence, the willingness of
member governments to invest in hiring and educating capa
ble regulators.
In the case of the SEC's mutual fund standards, the issue
is how to value fund shares each day.2n The appropriate valua
tion of shares is not clear-cut, as some mutual fund holdings
are illiquid while others may change in value in domestic after
hours trading or trading on markets around the world occur
ring after the 4:00 p.m. market close in the United States. The
SEC's fair value standard is principles-based in that it stipulates
that a mutual fund has an obligation to determine the "fair"
value of the shares.27 As with the banking example, the regula
tion relies upon the party with access to the best information
to determine the appropriate value. Historically, most mutual
funds have chosen to use the close of business prices to deter
mine the fair value of the shares, although a few firms rely on a
separate pricing model to value shares when there has been a
substantial move in prices since the close of business.28 As
24.
25.
26.
2003 ) ,
27.

See generally B ASE L , sujmL note 23.
ld. at 1 4, 1 50, 1 8 1 , 1 83 , 1 95 .

See, e.g., Statement of Paul F. Roye t o O p e n Meeting of SEC ( Dec. 3,
available a t

h ttp: / / www .sec.gov/ news/ speech/ spc h 1 20303p fr. h tm.

See SEC Staff Letter to I nvestment Company I nstitute ( Dec. 30, 200 1 ) ,

available at h ttp:/ / www . sec.govI divisions/investmen t/ guidance/ tyle04300 1 .
h tm ; see also I nvestmen t Company Act o f 1 94 0 , 1 5 U . S . C .
§ 80 ( a) ( 2 ) (a) ( 4 l ) ( B ) .
28. For background on the mutual fun d industry, see RoBERT C. PozEN,
THE MuTUAL FuND BusiNESS ( 2d ed. 2002 ) .
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with the new Basel II standards, it remains to be seen how well
this approach will work.

The Case of Financial Accounting
Another area undergoing regulatory re-design is corpo
rate financial accounting. The requirements for corporate fi
nancial accounting were initially established after the stock
market crash in 1 9 29.29 At that time, corporate financial state
ments were not always audited, and accounting followed in
dustry practice rather than authoritative rules.30 The poor
quality of financial reporting was thought to be a signiflcant
factor leading to the stock market run-up and collapse. " ' In
response, Congress passed legislation that required the ac
counting industry to disclose regular flnancial statements that
have been audited by external parties.32
Outside investors require financial and accounting infor
mation that is both reliable and has been verified by auditors
who are independent of management. Traditionally, account
ing and auditing practices in the United States have been gov
erned by detailed rules.33 However, as recent scandals have
shown, transactions can be structured to circumvent the rules.
Enron's extensive use of special purpose entities, for example,
enabled the company to avoid reporting consolidated infor
mation about high levels of debt. 34
In the wake of these scandals, some observers have pro
posed an alternative, hybrid approach to flnancial accounting
standards, one that asserts an overarching principle that rele
vant and useful information should be reported.3"' A move to
29. Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It is To-
day: Part I, 1 7 AccouNTING HoRIZONS 1 89 , 1 89-205 (Sept. 2003 ) .
30. George 0 . May, Corporate Publicity and the A uditor, 42 jouRNAL OF Ac
couNTANCY 3 2 1 , 3 2 1 -26 ( Nov. 1 926).
3 1 . Ross L. 'vVATrs AND j EROLD L. Znvtl\t ERMAN, PoSITIVE AccouNTINc THE
ORY (1 986) .
32. See generally Securities Act of 1 933, 1 5 U . S.C. § 77; Securities Ex
change Act of 1 934, 1 5 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq.
33. See Melone, supra note 1 6, at 1 1 62.
34. Edmund L. Jenkins, The FASB 's Role in Serving the Public: A Response to
the Emon CollajJSe (Mar. 1 4, 2002 ) , available at h ttp:/ / www.fasb.org/ n ews/
fasb_role. pdf
35. See Katherine Schipper, PrincijJles-Based A ccounting Standards, 1 7 Ac.
couNTING HoRIZONS 6 1 ( Mar. 2003) ; AAA Financial Accoun ting Standards
Committee, Evaluating ConcejJls-Based vs. Rules-Based Approaches to Standard
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more prin ciples-based system of accounting standards, how
ever, will face several i m portant challenges.
First, many accountants are not sufficiently trained to
make the requisite business-based judgment calls. Hence,
under a principles-based sys tem , many accountants could need
to undergo significant training to acquire new skills. Second,
corporate executives are encouraged, prin cipally through
compensation arrangements, to maximize shareholder value
in the ncar term. For principles-based s tandards to be effec
tive, the economic incentives that can lead managers to dis
close unreliable or biased information would still need to be
addressed. A restructuring of executive compensation con
tracts may be needed."·6 Third, in the absence of clear rules,
company accountants may need to exercise a higher degree of
professional resolve when results they are charged with
presenting accurately conflict with corporate executives' inter
ests. '" Outside auditors may similarly need to show greater re
solve when faced with client statem ents that are inconsistent
with broad accounting principlcs.">H Showing such resolve may
be particularly challenging, since audi tors and accountants
may be less able to predict how regulators or courts will apply
these principles in particular contexts."'')

a

Setting, 1 7 AccouNTING HoRIZONS 73 ( Mar. 2003 ) ; Mark W. Nelso n , Behav
io-ral Evidence on the Ejfects of Ptin cip!.es- and Rules-Based Stan dards, 1 7 Accou NT
ING H o R I Z O NS 9 1 ( Mar. 2003) .
36. For a lucid analysis of executive compensation more gen e rally, see
LUCIAN BEBC:I !UK & j ESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORI'v!ANC :E: TH E UNFUL
FILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COM PENSATION (2004 ) .
37. On the general pressures f�lCing company accountan ts, see William E .
Shafer, Ethical PtPssure, Otganizational-Pmfessional Conflict, and Related Wmk
Outcomes A mong l\!Ianagement Accountants, 38 J . Bus. ET H I C S 263 ( 2002 ) .
38. See Scott A . Taub, Speech Before the 2003 Thirty-Fi rs t AICPA Na
tional Conference on Curren t SEC Developments (Dec. 1 1 , 2003 ) (sug
gesting that "auditors need to get more comfortable telling clients that cer
tain accounting treatmen ts are unacceptable , even in the absence of li tera
ture that specifically says so" ) .
39. O f course, the status quo i s not always a n easy one for the audi tor i n
the face o f a n aggressive m an agement. As Roman \Ne il h as n o ted, i n a rules
based system, management can always challenge the auditor by demanding,
"Show me where it says I can 't." Roman Wei!, Fundamen tal Causes of the
Accoun ting Debacle at Enron: Show Me Where It Says I Can 't, Sum mary of
Testimony Presented to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
(Feb. 6, 2002 ) , available a t http:/ /w;vw.sec .gov/rules/proposecl/s74002/
rlweil l . h tm

In the end, notwithstanding the problems with rules
based accounting, businesses, auditors, and regulators may
well continue to welcome rules. vVith the business environ
m e nt in the United States seeming ever more litigious, corpo
rate leaders may resist movement toward principles and con
tin ue to favor rules as a way of reducing un certainty and avoid
ing costly litigation.

Looking Ahead
Just as the p roper balance between government regula
tion and self-regulation is l ikely to vary by situation, so too no
single spot on the continuum between principles and rules is
l ikely to apply in all circumstances. Both ends of the spectrum
have their strengths and weaknesses. Finding the point in the
range that is appropriate for a given particular issue will re
main a persistent challenge. A move to a more principles
based approach to accounting i n the United States will prove
especially challenging in the absence of greater political sup
port.
III.
ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement connects in important ways to both of the
issues we have discussed. ·whether the regulator is a govern
ment agency or a self-regulatory organization, its rules or prin
ciples must be enforced. As Voltaire argued, "It is well to kill
from time to time an admiral to encourage the others."40 In
this same vein , recent prosecutions have had l ife-altering ef
fects on both individuals and organizations. Jamie Olis of
Dynegy, for example, was sentenced to twenty-four years i n
prison for accounting fraud.41 Arthur Andersen LLP was ef
fectively put out of business after being convicted of obstruc
tion of justice.42
40. Voltaire, Can dide, in CANDIDE, Z;\DIC AND SELECTED STORIES 78-79
(Donald Frame, trans. 1 96 1 ) .
4 1 . Simon Romero, Ex-Executive Of Dpwgy Is Sentenced To 24 Years, N .Y.
T I �IES, Mar. 26, 2004, at C2.
42. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, A rulersen �5 Fall from Grace, 8 1 WASI-L
U . L. Q. 9 1 7 ( 2003 ) ; see alsoJennifer M. Niece & Gregory M. Trompeter, The
Demise of Arthur A n dersen 's On e-Firm Con cept: A Case-Study in CorjJorale Govern
ance, 1 09 Bus. & Soc'v RE\· 1 83 ( 2004 ) .
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Enforcement not only has m<�or consequences for indi
vidual and corporate violators, but it also can affect the overall
credibility of a regulatory system. Enforcement actions send a
message to the broader public. They both deter bad actors
and level the competitive playing field. That said, greater en
forcement is not always better, for taken too far it can dampen
socially valuable risk-taking. A.s with any important policy tool,
regulators need to know when and how to pursue enforce
ment actions, especially criminal prosecutions.

The Role and Limits of Criminal Sanctions
When employees' life-long pensions disappear in the
wake of corporate fraud, white-collar crimes can no longer be
seen as truly victimless. For the purpose of enforcement, then,
one important issue is whether victims of white-collar crime
are harmed more or less than victims of street crime. Some
argue that employees who lose their jobs or retirement savings
deserve to see the government give more than a mere wrist
slapping to executives who caused their losses.43 Others would
question the fairness of a system that imposes a twenty-four
year sentence on someone convicted of accounting fraud
when defendants convicted of criminal homicide often spend
less time than that in jail. 44
Whether fair or not, criminal sanctions certainly can be
effective in deterring corporate misconduct. Corporations, as
profit-making enterprises, are accustomed to balancing risk
and reward. The threat of a civil penalty may not be adequate
to deter misbehavior if corporate officials simply view potential
fines as "a cost of doing business." On the other hand, more
severe sanctions, such as imprisonment or being put out of
business, materially change the calculus. The possibility of go
ing to jail does tend to catch the attention of corporate offi
cials, and is often (though not always) enough to derail fur
ther contemplation of illegal conduct. Criminal law also em4 3 . See, e.g., Damien Cave, Lock Up the Analysts and Throw A.way the Key,
SALON ( May 1 7, 2002 ) , available at h ttp : / />v.vw.sal o n . c o m / te c h / feature/
2002/ OS /20 I analysts .

44. Kathryn Keneally, Some of the Distortions to jmtice Caused by the Sentenc
ing Guidelines, CHAMPION MAGAZ INE ( Nat'! A.ss ' n of Criminal D e fe ns e Law
yers) (Aug. 2004 ) , available at h ttp:/ hvww . nacdl . o rg/public. nsf/0/ 4a779f54
d2fbe l ce85256f1 7006bc605?0penDocument.
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powers other law-abiding individuals - whether the board of
directors, senior management, or other professionals - to
stand up to less well intentioned colleagues or, at a minimum,
to resist going along with misconduct.
Yet criminal law is no panacea. First, many of the agen
cies that regulate business conduct lack the authority to im
pose criminal sanctions. For example, even though the SEC,
the PCAOB, and the Office of the Secretarv of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts play key roles in overseeing important
corporate activities, none are authorized to seek or impose
criminal sanctions. Second, criminal sanctions such as fines
and imprisonment cannot provide restitution to shareholders,
employees, vendors, or others injured by corporate miscon
duct. Third, not everyone will be deterred by the threat of
criminal prosecution, as some people are prepared to accept a
short prison sentence rather than pay back personal or corpo
rate profits. Finally, criminal sanctions may raise the stakes so
high that they unintentionally chill legitimate and economi
cally beneficial conduct. For these reasons, effective enforce
ment is likely to depend on the continued use of civil penalties
combined with the selective use of criminal sanctions.
/

The Organization as Defendant
Many of the strategic decisions facing prosecutorial and
civil enforcement staff will be the same whether sanctions are
criminal or civil. One of these decisions involves against whom
to file an enforcement action . Enforcement officials can pur
sue just the individuals who actually engaged in the underlying
offense, they can name managers or the board of directors for
failing to supervise properly, or they can even go after the cor
poration itself.
One conference participant noted that maj or scandals fos
ter a "lynch-mob mentality" that drives both the public and
enforcement officials to want to pursue the people at the top,
regardless of whether they have clone something warranting
punishment.45 Prosecutorial discretion , however, ultimately
requires a reasonable balancing of both individual fairness
and public policy considerations. Charging the corporation,
45. In order to facilitate open dialogue, the workshop discussion was
conducted on a not-for-attribution basis, so statements are not identified i n
this article with the name o f any specific participant.
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for example, may do much to deter others in an industt;, but
it mav also negatively
affect manv people bevond those who
....._.,
violated the law. This concern is especially palpable in the
case of a criminal indictment, as shown by the demise of Ar
thur Andersen; however, it is also relevant in civil cases since
large punitive fines may put a company on the brink of finan
cial ruin.
In deciding whether to charge the corporate entity, en
forcement officials should consider the nature of the underly
ing conduct in relation to the overall operations of the busi
ness. It is easier to justify criminal or civil sanctions against the
organization when the organization-and not merely the bad
employee-benefits from the misconduct. For example, an
antitrust violation by which a company increases its profits is a
better candidate for an organizational prosecution than a case
of embezzlement by an employee that benefits the employee
only (and in which the company is itself a victim) .
Another factor to consider is whether a corporation has
systemically failed to supervise its officers and employees.
Companies' boards and senior management are responsible
for the overall culture of the organization. They must put in
place procedures, training, and monitoring that are reasona
bly designed to prevent and detect violations of regulations.
Recent legislative developments require that public companies
implement such stPps, including ( 1 ) a code of ethics,4(' (2) cer
tification of financial information by the chief executive of
ficer and chief financial officer,n and (3) procedures that em
power and protect employees who may wish to report miscon
duct.4R Isolated misconduct that occurs despite these
safeguards, and of which management was actually unaware,
generally would not give rise to proceedings against the com
pany, or even against senior management.
J

J

j

/

Federal versus State Law Enforcement
Corporate actors face the threat of enforcement by multi
ple regulators. When the SEC was created in 1 934, states al
ready had jurisdiction over securities matters and they con46. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, sufna n o te 2, § 406.
47. !d. § 404.
48. !d. § 11 07.
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tinue to retain much authority:'9 State and fede ral prosecu
tors also co-exist with self-regulators such as the NYSE and the
NASD. The existence of multiple regulators has often been
justified in part on the premise that competition among en
forcement agencies results in optimal deterrence. '0
The deterrent value of multiple enforcers depends, how
ever, in part on regulations being clear and consistent across
jurisdictions. Variations across jurisdictions only give compa
nies opportunities to exploit the differences. Moreover, if the
existence of multiple enforcers creates a patchwork of incon
sistent, sometimes even incompatible, legal rulings, this can be
counterproductive for businesses engaged in interstate or in
ternational commerce.
Even vvhen rules are clear and universally accepted, the
presence of multiple enforcement authorities can create
problems. Political factors may motivate enforcement agen
cies to insist on being "at the table" in dealing with a major
crisis. Or different agencies may compete against each other
to see which can impose the toughest sanctions. Competition
motivated by a desire to score political points can hinder the
overall objective of enforcement, either by overly complicating
resolution of enforcement actions or by misallocating scarce
resources so that other important regulatory problems go ne
glected.
Finally, it may be difficult to maintain the proper balance
between enforcement at the federal, state, and self-regulatory
levels when one regulator is perceived-rightly or wrongly-as
lax or ineffective. Others will rush in to fill the perceived vac
uum. For example, the recent mutual fund la-wsuits filed by
New York, Massachusetts, and other states against broker-deal
ers and investment advisers took aim at conduct that tradition-

49. JoEL SEL.ICi\IAN, THE TRANSFORMATION oF \•VALL STREET: A HISTORY oF
THE SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE CoMMISSION .-\ND MoDERN CoRPOR-·\TE Fr.
NANCE 42-50 ( 1 995) .
50. See Roberta S. Kannel, AjJjJrojJriateness of Regulation at the Federal or Stall'
Ler,el: Reconciling federal and State Interests in Securities RPgulation in the United
States and !:�urope, 28 B ROOKuN J. INT'L L. 495 ( 2003) ( noting that " [s] ome
scholars believe that competiti o n among fi nancial regulators is beneficial
and results i n an optimum level of regulatory i n trusion upon ptivate busi
ness i n terests") .
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ally fell within the SEC's province."'1 Those who believe the
SEC was insufficiently interested in pursuing leads about im
proper conduct in the mutual funds industry may well con
clude that the state litigation shows the value of enforcement
competition. Yet, taken too far, it is also possible that such
competition will waste resources and generate inconsistent rul
ings across jurisdictions. "'�

Looking Ahead
The existence of multiple enforcers, each facing choices
about whether to pursue criminal or civil penalties against ei
ther individuals or organizations, makes regulatory enforce
ment a complicated enterprise. Competition among enforce
ment jurisdictions certainly can increase deterrence. How
ever, in the future, continued efforts at coordination among
enforcement officials are likely to be needed to allocate lim
ited enforcement resources sensibly and to ensure fairness and
consistency in the overall regulatory system.
IV.
CoNcr .usroN

The cns1s of confidence in America's capital markets,
sparked by the corporate scandals of the past several years, has
generated widespread debate over proposals for regulatory
changes. Underlying these discussions are fundamental policy
issues about the role of government in corporate governance.
Although these policy issues are sometimes framed as simple
dichotomies-for example, government regulation versus self
regulation, principles versus rules, or criminal versus civil pen
alties-the choices government faces are in fact neither simple
nor dichotomous.
V\That, then, is the role of government in corporate gov
ernance? It is undoubtedly not any single role, but different
roles-that of policymaker, enforcer, and overseer-in differ
ent situations. Accordingly, there is still another fundamental
5 1 . William H. Donaldson, SEC Chai rman , Speech at NASAA Confer
ence (Sept. 1 4, 2003 ) , available at http:/ / www . sec.gov/news/speech/spch09
l 403whd. h tm .
52. For a concise analysis of federal-state coordinati o n , s e e John C. Cof
fee, Competitive Federalism: 171.e Rise of the State Attome:y General, 230 N Y LJ 5
( Sept. 1 8, 2003) .
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role for government to undertake: the role of analyst, seeking
to identify the conditions under which to deploy different con
figurations of regulatory institutions, standards , and enforce
ment practices. Given the range of policy issues raised by cor
porate governance, and the variety of industries and firms in
volved, government decision makers will need to understand
thoroughly the effects that different regulatory actions can
have in terms of a range of policy criteria.
On the issue of self-regulation, this means, among other
things, considering the effectiveness of self-regulatory organi
zations as policymakers as well as their effectiveness as enforc
ers. It also calls for careful evaluation of the recent structural
changes in self-regulatory organizations. What impact will
these changes have on the credibility and effectiveness of self
regulation ?
O n the issue of regulatory design, decision makers need
to understand better what makes different degrees of specific
ity and generality "right" for particular types of regulatory
problems. They also need to assess whether certain hybrid sys
tems can overcome some of the limitations of rules or princi
ples alone.
Finally, on the issue of enforcement, state and federal offi
cials should analyze why some individuals and organizations
adhere responsibly to regulatory standards-and why others
do not. Such analysis would help enhance government's abil
ity pursue optimal enforcement, instead of u nder- or over-en
forcement.
The steps that government has already taken, and will un
doubtedly continue to take in the wake of the recent scandals,
will affect both the integrity and productivity of the American
economy. The success of these efforts will be made more
likely with careful attention to the kinds of issues summarized
in this article, and with further constructive discussion among
the many constituencies affected by the multiple roles that
government plays in corporate governance.

